decade of the Qing dynasty and track its continuous development over the first half of the twentieth century. They describe consistent efforts by the Chinese state, regardless of political formation or regime type, to constitute and mobilize the national people, a pattern that has continued through 1949 and up to the present. Such efforts at "political tutelage," to use Sun Yat-sen's term, served to rationalize and legitimize the modern bureaucratic state itself. Projects of organization and mobilization also effectively made the state by spawning new tiers of state functionaries-such as survey researchers, beat cops, and social bureaucrats-that became the face of institutions and agents of governance in local communities. As a result, Lam and Chen, who aim primarily to capture efforts by Chinese elites to characterize and cultivate society, also uncover and explain important dynamics of state making. Tong Lam's A Passion for Facts focuses on the introduction of the social survey as a novel technology of knowledge that Chinese intellectuals expected to generate accurate facts about society, thus making it legible to the state and susceptible to new forms of management and organization. During the nineteenth century, foreign observers criticized Qing officials and scholars for lacking basic, verifiable knowledge about Chinese society. In a dynamic that is now familiar from studies of the introduction of Western conceptions of national character, hygiene, and civility, Chinese intellectuals' perception of deficiencies in indigenous forms of social knowledge drove their embrace of foreign social science methods starting in the first decade of the twentieth century. 1 According to Lam, social surveys and statistics emerged as privileged methods for producing empirical knowledge about society and reenvisioning how it was constituted: "social surveys became a political necessity in this context not only because they produced empirical knowledge of the social world for the state, but also because they provided Culp 156 E-Journal No. 6 (March 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-6) new specifications for how individuals and groups should relate to the state and to one another" (49).
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review
In the core chapters of the book, Lam assesses a succession of social survey projects undertaken during the first half of the twentieth century. First, and in many ways most interesting, is his thoughtful account of the late Qing census, which was conducted between 1909 and 1912. Lam argues persuasively that the New Policy (Xinzheng) project of a national census represented an effort to constitute Qing sovereignty on a new basis. By comprehensively counting the whole population, the state intended to represent a unified national community, corresponding to a territorial geobody, in contrast to the plural populations of Han, banner, and border communities that had characterized the Qing empire at its height. This undifferentiated national community-counted as individuals (kou) who were not distinguished by gender (nanding, nukou), ethnicity, language, or religious group-would constitute the citizenry for a new constitutional order. In Lam's terms, " [b] y insisting on counting each individual and household directly using the same set of methods and categories, the new census essentially replaced the old hierarchical order with a new social order in which men, women, children, Han, Manchu, and so forth were all treated as equal and autonomous enumerative units that constituted the social body" (74, emphasis added).
In many ways, the social surveys conducted by intellectuals and state agents during the subsequent decades can all be viewed as efforts to elaborate and add substance and nuance to this statistical picture of the national community. Next Lam describes archeological digs, rural surveys, and ethnographic studies of the border regions conducted by scholars from Academia Sinica's Institute of History and Philology (IHP) and the Central Political Institute's Research Institute of Land Economics (RILE). He then assesses the Nationalist government's much less successful efforts gathering census data during the Nanjing decade (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) Although A Passion for Facts focuses on the first half of the twentieth century, Lam carefully considers continuities and discontinuities between late imperial and foreign-influenced early twentieth-century practices. For instance, he distinguishes between Qing-era textual empiricism, which used philological methods to locate a universal and transhistorical moral ground in canonical texts, and modern social survey research, which explored existing social conditions to establish facts about society and nation in a specific geopolitical and temporal context (2) (3) (19) (20) . Even in instances where late imperial practices provided precedents for new research techniques, as with the census and ethnographic surveys, novel methodologies and approaches differentiated the current scholarship from the old. Whereas the Qing banner census was a genealogical project that mapped networks of relations through history, and the Ming-era census counted tax units more than people, the late Qing census used census agents to count This interface between state-and elite-run governmental institutions and the Chinese people is, in many ways, the primary focus of Janet Chen's Guilty of Indigence. But she launches her study by portraying how modern Chinese intellectuals came to know society in new ways, through thoughtful analysis of their efforts to conceptualize poverty and the poor. Modern intellectuals' focus on poverty differed markedly from the late imperial period, during which, Chen observes, "wealth and poverty remained relatively weak markers of social differentiation in
Chinese society" (6). Chen masterfully surveys how late Qing social theorists and officials came to view poverty as a key factor in the Qing empire's decline in relation to impinging global powers and as a limit on national development (14-19). Later she analyzes how the modern academic discipline of sociology shifted from trying to draw an absolute numerical poverty line based on level of family income to focusing on degrees of dependency and productive labor, identifying poverty most closely with "parasitism," or consuming without producing (46-60).
"As May Fourth intellectuals and sociologists pondered its causes and consequences for the Culp 159
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 6 (March 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-6) nation's future," Chen writes, "they used the idea of the parasite to describe the nonworking poor. Juxtaposed against an emerging left-wing discourse sanctifying labor, the notion of the 'social parasite' delineated the boundaries of social citizenship based on an individual's productive contribution" (47). Through this analysis, Chen explains how new systems of knowledge, especially sociology, worked to create "the poor" as a relevant, marginal social category while equating citizenship with active contribution to the nation through labor.
Consequently, discourse about and policies related to the marginal poor played a significant role in normalizing a mainstream conception of social citizenship that equated it with productive contributions to the nation. Sociological analysis and social policy that distinguished between a majority of productive contributors and a minority of "parasitic," dependent poor helped configure the Chinese national community and define its legitimate members, as did Lam's census and social surveys.
Much of Guilty of Indigence explores how states and social elites created institutions for poverty relief that had the practical effect of delineating particular social groups as "the poor" and exposing them to new regimes of incarceration, discipline, and labor. Chen's incisive analysis of how abstract concepts and categories from social science were reified in institutions and applied to different sectors of Chinese society is one of the great achievements of this book.
Insofar as intellectuals and state agents identified poverty as a "social problem" because it meant that significant segments of the population were consuming but not producing for the nation, antipoverty programs from the late Qing into the early People's Republic of China (PRC) period focused on training and mobilizing the poor for productive labor. One of the striking findings of this study is the remarkable continuity in strategies for poverty relief over this fifty-year period.
In chapters that successively focus by turns on Beijing and Shanghai during the late Qing New Policy period (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) , the early Republic (1912 Republic ( -1927 , the Nanjing decade (1927-1937), wartime occupation (1937-1945) , the civil war period (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) , and the early PRC (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) Nationalist government came to call "active relief" (jiji jiuji) (92). Such programs sought to teach skills of a basic trade and instill habits of diligence through institutionally imposed discipline rather than breeding dependency through dispensing handouts. However, Chen demonstrates that in practice the combined effects of growing numbers of poor and displaced people, limited state resources, organizational inefficiencies, and widespread corruption often led to those identified as "poor" being exposed to incarceration and discipline while receiving minimal relief and few opportunities to work themselves out of poverty.
Drawing on extensive archival research, Chen illustrates vividly how campaigns against poverty affected the daily lives of individuals designated as poor. Starting with the book's opening pages, which document police taking in a homeless boy and entrusting him to a workhouse instead of the streets, the reader learns about the sometimes serendipitous mechanisms by which individuals were identified as one or another category of poor-beggar or working poor, refugee or vagrant-and how encounters with the staff and routines of particular institutions could shape their life trajectories. Chen describes police forces, workhouses, orphanages, and poorhouses that came to have significant power to define subjects in particular ways and to impose specific patterns of behavior on them.
Yet she also captures remarkable instances of resistance, where people actively claimed social citizenship using the terms and categories introduced through social science research and instituted by the state. Through a series of examples from Shanghai, in particular, Chen demonstrates how working poor aggressively petitioned the Shanghai Municipal Council and Nationalist government, claiming full social citizenship on the basis of their productive labor and their residence in shack settlements (81-84, 116-127, 202-210 ). Chen's precise framing and parsing of poor people's petitions allow us to hear the voices of the urban underclass and have some understanding of their life experience without ever feeling that she is overreaching or speculating. Shack settlers' ability to push back against eviction drives and to maintain a foothold in the city illustrates how designations of social citizenship were negotiated and not Through analysis of new knowledge systems introduced to grasp society and new institutions intended to define social groups and shape citizens, both of these books also contribute to our understanding of the modern Chinese state. They do so in many ways, but I will highlight two aspects that have particular relevance to the study of twentieth-century China.
First, they explain the process by which the modern Chinese state came to be abstracted from society as a set of structures and institutions governing the population, which Lam, following Timothy Mitchell, calls the "state effect." Second, they describe the emergence of a whole range of functionaries-census takers and social bureaucrats, beat cops and guards-with varying degrees of technical knowledge and specialized roles that came to lead or operate those institutions. Better understanding these two dynamics helps us grasp how the modern Chinese state has established itself since the start of the twentieth century as such a powerful governor of the population.
By the "state effect," Mitchell means how "mundane processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, supervision and surveillance, and representation . . . create the effect of the state not only as an entity set apart from economy or society, but as a distinct dimension of structure, framework, codification, expertise, information, planning, and intentionality" (1999, 95) . Lam, invoking Mitchell, argues that "[t]he practices of censuses and social surveys, and especially their emphasis on the observer versus the observed, produced a new, heightened, and oppositional state and society relationship in which the abstract structure
[that] came to be understood as the state was increasingly seen as an object standing apart from the social world" (141). The state here emerges through the practice of new technologies of knowledge designed to map and organize the national population as a whole. Specific practices of counting, categorizing, and calculating fostered the experience of the state as an abstracted entity capable of creating and possessing knowledge about society. 3 Powerful state effects are also captured in Chen's analysis of institutions for poverty relief. In her account the state effect was generated through municipal systems that worked to differentiate among categories of poor, institutionalize those designated as vagrant and indigent, and impose various kinds of discipline and cultivation on them. These effects may have been clearest in the Nanjing decade, during which, "[i]n the arena of charity and punishment, newly constituted local governments interjected their resources, policing mechanisms, and disciplinary powers into the lives of the urban poor in new ways" (87). The fact that effective social relief came to be viewed as a key barometer of the validity of Nationalist government claims to sovereignty and legitimacy (91-92) indicates the extent to which social management was a vital element of modern state formation.
Just as important as these books' analyses of how the modern Chinese state emerged as an abstraction standing apart from society are their careful accounts of the many agents that ran the state's systems and managed its institutions. In terms of social surveys, Lam points out that although research studies might have been planned by social scientists or leading government officials, "more often than not they were carried out by specially trained fieldworkers, census takers, police officers, student trainees, health officers, and even bureaucrats" (6). For the late Qing census, for example, the government appointed a whole new category of "investigative supervisors" (diaochazhang), who oversaw "investigators" (diaochayuan), made up mostly of police officers or local elites, who actually carried out the census (69). Implementing the census and other social surveys created a veritable army of new state functionaries empowered to carry out specific tasks of governance. We later learn, for instance, that the 1928 municipal census in Nanjing alone entailed the mobilization of more than eight thousand census takers to simultaneously canvass all the homes in the city (121). These groups served as the concrete point Chen's analysis of systems for poverty relief and reform through labor reveal involvement by an even broader spectrum of state functionaries, ranging from social bureaucrats to workhouse guards, who played key roles in each aspect of poverty management. Perhaps most fascinating is the fact that initial distinctions among various categories of the poor were almost always made by police on the street. Repeatedly throughout Guilty of Indigence, we see instances where police decided on the spot whether particular individuals were legitimate working poor, career beggars, dangerous vagrants, or pitiful refugees (1, 33-34, 62-63, 100, 114, 139, 162, 184-185) . However refined and systematic social scientific categories of urban poverty might have been, in practice they were often applied first by beat cops and police detectives. Though these groups had only limited social scientific training, if any, they were key agents in implementing these new systems of categorization. In the workhouses and relief homes we encounter many other state agents, ranging from a growing cadre of social bureaucrats in the Nationalist Party's Social Affairs Bureaus, to each institution's directors, social workers, administrative staffs, and guards. During periods of relative state stability, such as the Nanjing decade, we see systematic application of new social research techniques by social bureaucrats and more professionalized management of relief institutions (e.g., 93-96, 99) , with Social Affairs Bureau staff in one instance even arranging marriages and adoptions (182) (183) (184) . But in periods of turmoil and limited state resources, patterns of neglect and malfeasance were more likely (140, (195) (196) . Besides illuminating how the emergent state functioned on the ground, Chen's and Lam's careful tracking of the activities of these state functionaries has important implications for historical understanding of cultural and social developments in modern China. On the cultural or intellectual side, they remind us that new systems of knowledge may have been introduced by leading intellectuals and foreign-trained scholars, but they depended for their dissemination, implementation, and institutionalization on a much broader group of minor functionaries. These groups, Chen and Lam show us, had limited education or specialized training, yet they served as the main foot soldiers of new processes of social research and state governance. On the social side, these low-ranking functionaries-census takers, police, social bureaucrats, guards, and managers-formed a significant subset of the emergent class of "petty urbanites" (xiao shimin) that constituted a growing tier in modern Chinese cities. 4 Along with bank clerks, teachers, copy editors, and journalists, they helped form an emergent white-collar class that, as Chen demonstrates, sometimes hovered just above the working poor that they worked to regulate.
Although both of these books cover the tumultuous period of rapid change from the end of the Qing to the early PRC period, they emphasize the continuity of patterns set in the late
Qing that persisted deep into the twentieth century. Chen demonstrates that regimes and social elites from the late Qing onward lamented the "parasitism" of the indigent poor and sought to transform them into productive citizens through enforced labor, contributing to a normative conception of social citizenship that equated it with positive contributions to the nation (228- 
